Johnson: Liberty by Necessity
1

Liberty by Necessity: an Examination of Fate and Free Will in Homer and
Boethius
Isaac Johnson, Samford University
Fate and freedom: can they coexist? Is there a divine reasoning behind
the occurrences in the universe, and if so, are all occurrences predetermined?
Such questions have plagued philosophers for more than two thousand years.
Some philosophers deny the existence of human freedom and leave everything
in the hands of God or fate; some philosophers argue that everything is random;
and some philosophers insist there is room for human freedom under the general
guidance of a divine hand. They generally rely on complex, rigorous systems,
with logical consistency and existential evidence. These systems, however, are
not airtight, and the question of fate and free will is left unresolved.
Systematic philosophers are not the only ones to grapple with the concept
of fate. It is also a poetic and literary concept. Poets and writers are fascinated
by a strange incongruence in human existence: humans seem free to make
choices and control their own destiny, but there are always instances in life that
remain above human volition. The poets and writers recognize this as one of the
mysteries of the human condition: is freedom an illusion and the course of life
determined by an outside force? If so, is that outside force unconscious, or is it
intelligent? If intelligent, is it benign? In poetry and literature, unlike in
philosophy, these questions do not need to be resolved.
This paper examines the approach to fate and free will by both a
philosopher, Boethius, and a poet, Homer, in their respective works The
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Consolation of Philosophy and The Iliad. Both writers develop sophisticated
systems of fate, though Boethius as a philosopher presents a more internally
consistent system, while Homer as a poet presents a more open system that
depends on the perspectives of the poem’s characters. In The Consolation,
Boethius explains that God controls the entire universe through his divine reason
or Providence, which unfolding in time is labeled Fate. Inanimate objects and
irrational beings are ruled by Fate, but human beings, gifted with reason, have
the free will to escape the rule of Fate and instead become aligned with the mind
of God; they are responsible for the morality of their behavior. In The Iliad, the
god Zeus makes large-scale plans that unfold in somewhat loose ways; there are
also larger-scale plans outside of his decision-making sphere that he tries to
bring about, and individual fates of humans that are inflexible and set in stone.
Despite these certainties, humans have freedom to act within them and thus gain
glory or shame depending on their actions. Both authors insist that there is room
for human freedom within the scope of Fate, and this inclusion raises problems
that defeat their systems.
Divine plan
Both Boethius and Homer acknowledge that God or the gods have a plan
for the world and for human beings, but they disagree on the scope of this plan.
According to Boethius, God’s plan for the world is eternal and all-encompassing,
while Homer’s Zeus creates a plan specifically for Achilles, not for the whole
world, not preexistent, and influenced by the prayers of humans.
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According to Boethius, God’s plan is called Providence, the divine reason
of God (104). This divine reason is above everything, unmoved by any external
force or intelligence (Chadwick 234); in turn, it is the first cause and mover of
everything else (Marenbon 118-119). Providence is the non-extended plan, but
when it unfolds within the confines of time and space it is called Fate (Boethius
104). Fate is bound to and operates under Providence, but human volition is free
from the laws and burdens of Fate while remaining under Providence. Indeed,
the closer one’s mind aligns with the mind of God, the freer one becomes from
Fate (Chadwick 242). Providence is inherently good and just, specifically just to
humans, who are the focus of Providence. Events that occur in time often seem
unjust or evil, but these things will always result in something ultimately good
(Marenbon 119). Personified Philosophy says, “All fortune whether pleasant or
averse is meant either to reward or discipline the good or to punish or correct the
bad” (Boethius 111). So all that befalls humans, good or bad, is meant to edify
their souls and bring them closer to the mind of God—to Providence—even if this
ultimate end cannot be understood by human minds.
Homer, too, conceives of a divine plan for human beings. Zeus, the king
of the gods, has a measure of control over events that will take place, and his
decrees are not revocable, nor can anyone stand in their way. Prior to the Trojan
War, Zeus decreed that the Greeks would take Troy in the tenth year of the war
(Homer 103). He agrees to glorify Achilles after Thetis beseeches him, bowing
his head to signify this decree—and once he has done this, the decree cannot be
reversed (95). Later on in the story, Zeus develops his plan for Achilles: Hector
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will wreak havoc on the Achaeans, Achilles’ friend Patroclus will go out in
response and die at Hector’s hand, and then Achilles will be roused to action and
gain his glory (247).
Clearly, Zeus’s plan is smaller and less abstract than Boethius’s
Providence. While Providence is an eternal idea, not bound by time, Zeus
makes up his plan as he goes along. First he agrees to glorify Achilles, and later
he makes a specific plan for Achilles’ glorification. This plan concerns only
Achilles and those around him in the war, unlike Providence, which governs the
entire history of the universe. Finally, Zeus’s plan is influenced by humans, as
when Thetis begs Zeus to glorify her human son Achilles (Lesky 175), but
Providence precedes humans—it brings them to their best ends and does not
merely operate at the mercy of their whims. Despite all these differences, both
Homer and Boethius agree that the high God’s plan, once established, cannot be
shaken or steered off course.
Inevitable, but divinely willed
Both Boethius and Homer make room for events in time that are not
directly imposed by the divine being, but are destined to happen—they are not
freely willed. According to Boethius, these events are the unfolding of Fate
according to the law of causation. To Homer, there are two types of destined
events that are not willed by the gods: large-scale destinies that supersede the
will of Zeus, and individual deaths of warriors that cannot be overruled by the
gods. The two disagree on the gods’ relationship to the inevitable: Boethius
believes that God is the ultimate cause of all events but does not unfold them in
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time, while Homer maintains that the gods’ plans are distinct from fate, yet the
gods work to make sure that fate unfolds correctly.
According to Boethius, nothing happens that is not ultimately part of God’s
plan. But God’s plan, when unfolding in time as Fate, leaves room for secondary
causation—one event causes another event to happen, while the ultimate cause
of these events is God. God is not the immediate cause of these events,
because he does not operate in time but sees all things as present—hence the
term Providence, meaning "looking forth”, as opposed to foreknowledge
(Boethius 132-133). Nonetheless, these events have causes—in some sense,
they are inevitable. Boethius makes a great effort, however, to explain that
causation does not imply necessity. It would seem that everything that happens
is necessary and inevitable—predetermined—if everything is ruled by causation.
But Boethius redefines the term "necessary.” To him, something is necessary if
and only if it is in its nature to exist in such a way—if it has always been that way
and always will be. It is not necessary if it is caused to be in a certain state at a
certain time. Everything is subject to causation, true, but causation is simply the
realization of one possible event—other things could happen, but do not happen.
Just because they do not happen does not imply that they could not have
happened, and therefore what happens is not necessary (135). These events
are contingent: God knows what will happen, and he is the ultimate cause of
what will happen, but certainly something else could have happened (Marenbon
40-41).
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But if God knows what will happen with these contingent events, are they
not therefore necessary events? Again, Boethius appeals to God’s eternal state
to answer this question. If a contingent event is unfolding in the present, it is
necessary insofar as it must be taking place at this very moment, but this
necessity is not imposed upon it. It was caused to happen but it could have been
caused to happen differently—what happened was not necessary. In the same
way God views time. All time is eternally present to him, and in the same way
that humans do not impose necessity on something when observing it, God does
not impose necessity on future events (Boethius 125). Overall, Boethius sees
Fate in inanimate nature as ultimately caused by God but separated by degrees
of causation, and inevitable but not constrained by absolute necessity.
Homer also sees necessary occurrences separate from the gods’ willed
intentions. These operate in large-scale destinies and in the individual deaths of
humans ("Fate”). The gods can steer the events of humans’ lives, glorifying or
humiliating them, but they cannot alter how and when a man will die, and they
cannot derail the ultimate course of humanity. Instead, they work to make sure
that the destiny of humanity is carried out and not violated. Zeus recognizes a
sense of ultimate destiny, pertaining to the larger course of humanity, apart from
the plans he makes for Achilles and the other humans. Zeus does not feel
constrained by it, but works to fulfill it (Solomon 444): he relies on scales to tell
him who is destined to win a particular battle (Homer 233-234), and he
dispatches the gods to stop Achilles from destroying Troy before it is fated to fall
(504). This obeisance to fate is also evident in Poseidon, another god: he sees
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that the line of Dardanus is destined to survive the destruction of Troy through
Aeneas, so he rescues the hero from death at the hands of Achilles (513). The
gods do not control destiny, and they do not try to contradict it; instead, they keep
the humans from violating it.
Inevitable Fate above Zeus’s will is also evident in the deaths of the
heroes. Homeric "Fate” refers to the lifespan of the individual, whose ultimate
end is unavoidable; even the gods cannot stop it (Vivante, The Iliad: Action as
Poetry 92). It also refers to the inevitable end that all mortals face, as well as the
inescapable time and manner in which each individual will die (Solomon 449
450). The gods know that each hero has a specific death waiting for him, as the
next few examples demonstrate. Achilles’ goddess mother Thetis knows that he
is doomed to die young at Troy, but all she can do is lament; his death cannot be
avoided (Homer 91). Zeus considers saving his son Sarpedon when the Trojan
warrior is about to face Patroclus, but Hera stops him, recognizing that Sarpedon
must die (427); later, Zeus contemplates rescuing Hector from Achilles, but
Athena reminds him Hector was doomed long ago (547). The gods foresee
individuals’ deaths, and do not stand in Fate’s way.
Homer and Boethius both show that things happen according to Fate in
this world beyond human volition and distinct from divine mandate, but they
disagree on the gods’ involvement in the unfolding of this Fate. Homer’s gods
are omniscient but not omnipotent; they know the destiny of Troy or the ultimate
deaths of individual warriors, but cannot stop them or alter them. Instead, they
act as servants to Fate, preventing humans from making Fate go awry. They are
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heavily involved in the unfolding of Fate, even if they do not will it. Boethius’s
God, on the other hand, is omniscient and omnipotent, but separated from the
unfolding of Fate by the dimension of time. In God’s eyes, he causes all events
to unfold under Providence, but in the human dimension of time, God does not
actively unfold events. Thus, Homer’s gods cannot change Fate but make sure it
is carried out, and Boethius’s God rules over Fate but does not render events in
time necessary; they unfold according to his law of causation.
Human agency

Both Boethius and Homer make efforts to preserve human free will and
responsibility in their systems of fate. Boethius explains that humans still have
free will because they are rational beings and their minds are not controlled by
the laws of inanimate nature, while also referring to his argument that foreknown
events in time are not necessary, despite God’s all-encompassing Providence.
This is important to him because it absolves God of the behaviors of evil men
and deletes complacency or resignation—humans must choose to live morally.
Human free will in Homer is found in the phenomenon of double causation,
wherein a god intervenes in a human’s actions, but the human is still left
responsible for what occurs. In both cases, the insistence on human agency and
denial of necessity renders the previously developed concepts of Fate weak.
Boethius believes that humans have free will because they are rational
beings. If a being has reason it has the ability to make decisions, and this
decision-making is what distinguishes rational beings from non-rational beings
(Boethius 119). Non-rational beings are controlled by the laws of physics—they
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cannot decide what to do, but rather operate under the causality of Fate. But
minds are free from these material laws and can make choices (Marenbon 123).
They can either choose to become more like the mind of God, freeing
themselves from Fate, or they can turn from the mind of God and instead
become subject to the materialistic controls of Fate (Boethius 105). This idea of
free will seems problematic if Providence controls everything and if God is
omniscient. However, as stated before, Boethius does not see God’s
omniscience rendering all occurrences necessary. According to his explanation
of contingency, Boethius argues that humans have choices with regard to what
will happen. God knows what is going to happen, but humans still have to make
a choice to make it happen. Boethius also cites another argument to negate the
idea that human agency is enslaved to necessity. He believes that things can
only be known within the capacity of the knower: the thing itself is not known
(126). This is known as the lamblichus Principle (Sharples 216). He uses this
idea to argue that not only is God’s knowledge in a non-temporal dimension, but
fundamentally of a different nature than human knowledge. Humans presuppose
that God sees things way they do, and by human logic, Providence and
omniscience would render human free will impossible; but God sees beyond this
quandary. In God’s eternally-present dimension, things are bound to happen
according to his plan, but on the human and temporal level, man can clearly see
that he has free choice. In this system humans are compelled to choose to live
rightly, as Philosophy says on the last lines of The Consolation: “A great
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necessity is laid upon you...to be good, since you live in the sight of a judge who
sees all things” (Boethius 137).
Homer presents a similar idea of human agency, although not as
philosophically dense. Zeus’s plans and the unfolding of Fate do not remove
human responsibility. Homer’s story is about humans infused with divine
qualities, the choices they make, and the glory or shame they receive. Were the
gods given all credit or blame for the occurrences, the humanity of the epic would
be gone. Within Homeric epic, the gods should not be seen as controlling
humans or removing their will, but enhancing human characteristics; the gods
work through humans and even dictate the outcome, but the humans are clearly
the agents of action (Lesky 179-180). This phenomenon is double causation: on
the divine level, the god intervenes and brings about an end, but on a lower level,
the humans perform it and are not left free of praise or blame. Zeus makes
large-scale decrees, but does not remove the human ability to make individual
decisions; for example, Zeus declares Hector to be doomed but Hector decides
on his own whether to fight Achilles (Lesky 173). The humans themselves are
aware of divine influence, but do not blame everything on the gods; they assume
personal responsibility, such as when Helen recognizes that Aphrodite has
bewitched her but calls herself a "bitch” anyway for her role in the Trojan War
(Lesky 195). The gods enhance or diminish human abilities, and often dictate the
outcome of an event, but the humans themselves make the decisions during the
event and are left with the corresponding praise or blame.
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Both Homer and Boethius make room for human agency by appealing to
the distinction between the realm of the divine and the realm of humans. The
Iamblichus Principle and double causation present the same idea: on the divine
level, yes, humans are to some extent pawns of divine will, but this does not
remove human responsibility or choice on the human level. In Boethius’s case,
humans assume that God’s all-encompassing plan deletes human decision
because they do not understand the way God knows the world; their knowledge
is limited to the temporal realm. Nonetheless, in this temporal realm humans still
have to make decisions; God’s Providence can in no way negate human
rationality. Homer’s idea is slightly different: things are caused both by divine will
and by human action. Different beings are responsible for the same willed
events, but these beings are in different dimensions. Both authors preserve
human agency by acknowledging the fundamental distinction between the divine
mind and the human mind.
Can Human Freedom and Fate Coexist?
In their efforts to preserve human agency, Boethius and Homer face an
issue: can humans, through free choice, dislodge the ultimate plan/destiny of the
world? This is problematic for Boethius because his system claims that there is
nothing outside God’s Providence. This problem is evident in Homer when the
gods step in to stop humans from violating Fate. Is it possible for the overarching
plan or destiny of the world to fail, and if it is possible but does not occur, what
accounts for this?
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Boethius’s system is built on a contradiction. He claims that Providence
arranges "what is best for the individual” (Chadwick 243). Yet, at the same time,
he insists on human freedom within this system. If humans are free, it would
seem they have the option of violating the arrangements of Providence. Yet,
Providence is always operating to bring about good and determine what is best
for the individual. How, then, does God direct humans toward what is best for
them if human volition is free? Do humans always choose the path that fits with
the plans of Providence, thereby making everything a fortunate roll of the dice?
Or do humans reject God’s plan and render Providence ineffectual? Do humans,
when they turn away from the divine mind and instead become ensnared in the
clutches of Fate, find themselves in another God-controlled mechanism,
Providence, and thus without freedom after all? For even if God does not directly
control events in contingent events unfolding in Fate due to his eternality, he is
still their ultimate cause and is omniscient; the freedom of contingency is not truly
free. If Providence does not take away human volition, then the realization of
Providence is left unaccounted for.
Homer’s system also leaves room for a quandary because of agency. Is
Fate truly inevitable, or can it be overturned if the gods do not follow it? At
several points in the Iliad, gods ponder not following Fate. Zeus asks the gods if
he should suspend the deaths of Sarpedon and Hector, even though they are
doomed, as if he has a choice to overrule this Fate. It is only at the counsel of
Hera and Athena that he decides not to intervene—Athena tells him that he can
do as he pleases but "none of the deathless gods will praise you” (Homer 547).
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It also appears that humans themselves can defeat the cruel hand of Fate.
Achilles is capable of defeating Troy before it is fated to fall, and of destroying
Aeneas before he is fated to die. Only because the gods decide to intervene is
Achilles stopped. Thus, Fate is only a powerful and inevitable force insofar as
the gods decide to uphold it. So why do they uphold it, and why should they
disallow humans from altering it? Homer, like Boethius, has left the realization of
Fate unaccounted for—Fate does happen, and the gods are responsible for
making sure it happens, but there is no explanation as to why it has to happen.
Conclusion
The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius and The Iliad by Homer
suggest that the world is governed largely by divine decrees, that there is some
room for an extra-divine force called Fate, and that humans have the freedom to
choose within the bounds of these forces. Homer’s divine decrees are the plans
that Zeus creates within time, while Boethius creates the concept of Providence,
the eternal reason of God that always brings about ultimate good. Boethius sees
Fate as underneath Providence, but should be understood by humans as a non
divine force which operates under the binding laws of physics, while Homer sees
this entity as separate from Zeus, possibly above him, ruling the destiny of
mankind and declaring the irrevocable deaths of men.
Both authors understand the need for freedom within their systems—for
Boethius, man must understand he has freedom so he can act responsibly and
with moral urgency, and for Homer, man must be free so that the choices of
heroes can be legitimately judged honorable or dishonorable. Boethius believes
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humans are free because they are rational and operate in time, meaning that free
choice and contingency are inevitable, while Homer sees humans as free
because they operate on a different plane than the gods—though the gods
enhance human behavior, they do not revoke human responsibility. This last
inclusion topples both systems—Boethius leaves the door open for the defeat or
failure of powerful Providence, while Homer renders Fate revocable. The
ambiguity and incongruence of Homer’s system is deliberate, as he is a poet—it
does not detract from his work or his goals. But Boethius sets out to make a
deliberate doctrine of Providence, and his unconvincing attempt to account for
human freedom shakes the foundation of his entire theory. As Boethius and
Homer show in their works, Fate and freedom cannot easily coexist.
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